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                                 Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety? 
 
                                               Spyridon Orestis Palermos 
 
 
ABSTRACT. The aim of the present paper is to argue that robust virtue epistemology is 
correct. That is, a complete account of knowledge is not in need for an additional modal 
criterion in order to account for knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. I begin by presenting 
the problems facing robust virtue epistemology by examining two prominent 
counterexamples—the Barney and ‘epistemic twin earth’ cases. After proposing a way in 
which virtue epistemology can explain away these two problematic cases, thereby, implying 
that cognitive abilities are also safe, I offer a naturalistic explanation in support of this last 
claim, inspired by evolutionary epistemology. Finally, I argue that naturalized epistemology 
should not be thought of as being exclusively descriptive. On the contrary, the evolutionary 
story I offer in support of the claim that reliability implies safety can provide us with a 
plausible epistemic norm.  
 
 
Abilities in Epistemology 
 
One of the most promising intuitions in contemporary epistemology is the idea that 
knowledge is accurate (i.e., true) belief, which is the product of cognitive ability. Call 
this the ability intuition on knowledge. Understood as both a necessary and sufficient 
condition on knowledge, the aforementioned intuition is captured by robust virtue 
epistemology in ways close to the following one: 
 
S knows that p if and only if S believes the truth regarding p because of (or out 
of, or through) a reliable belief-forming process (i.e., a cognitive ability).  
 
Similar formulations to the above can be found in the writings of such key figures of 
contemporary virtue epistemology as John Greco and Ernest Sosa.i This is a robust 
version of virtue epistemology as it is supposed to capture all the qualifications for 
knowledge, including the intuition that knowledge excludes luck, without the need for 
an additional anti-luck condition, such as the safety principle.ii   
 To see why robust virtue epistemologists might be so confident, consider the 
well-known (due to Chisholm) Roddy case:  
Roddy (Pritchard 2009: 11)iii 
Roddy is a farmer. One day he is looking into a field near-by and clearly sees 
something that looks just like a sheep. Consequently he forms a belief that there is a 
sheep in the field.  Moreover, this belief is true in that there is a sheep in the field in 
question. However, what Roddy is looking at is not a sheep, but rather a big hairy dog 
that looks just like a sheep and which is obscuring from view the sheep standing just 
behind. 
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As all the typical Gettier cases, the above example demonstrates that even though 
Roddy is justified in holding his belief (he sees a sheep-shaped object) and his belief 
is true (there is a sheep behind the sheep-shaped object), we must disallow knowledge 
to Roddy because of the luck involved in the way he gets things right. Robust virtue 
epistemologists, however, can accommodate this counterexample to the ‘justified-
true-belief’ account of knowledge, by claiming that, contra to their account, Roddy 
believes the truth of the matter because of/through/out of luck; the content of his 
belief may still be the product of a cognitive ability, but his believing the truth is due 
to luck.  Put another way, Roddy believes from ability and he believes the truth, but 
the fact that he believes from ability does not explain why Roddy has a true belief; 
luck does.          
 Robust virtue epistemology, therefore, is considered to be an adequate account 
of knowledge, one that can handle the knowledge-undermining epistemic luck 
involved in typical Gettier-cases. Present in the literature, however, there are two 
more counterexamples that allegedly place robust virtue epistemology in a rather 
awkward position. Let us consider them in a chronological order of appearance. 
 First comes the Barney-case: 
Barney (Pritchard 2009: 12)iv  
Barney is driving through the country and happens to look out of the window into a 
field. In doing so, he gets to have a good look at a barn-shaped object, whereupon he 
forms the belief that there is a barn in the field. This belief is true, since what he is 
looking at is really a barn. Unbeknownst to Barney, however, he is presently in ‘barn-
façade country’ where every object that looks like a barn is a convincing fake. Had 
Barney looked at one of the fake barns, then he would not have noticed the 
difference. Quite by chance, however, Barney just happened to look at the one real 
barn in the vicinity. 
  
Barney comes to truly believe that he is looking at a real barn by employing his 
cognitive abilities; he is looking directly at the barn. Therefore, this is supposed to be 
a case where despite the fact that Barney’s true believing is because of/out of/through 
his cognitive ability, his cognitive success cannot be called knowledge given that his 
belief could have so easily been false (Barney is in a barn-façade environment).  
 Before moving on to the next counterexample, notice a subtle difference. In 
regular Gettier-cases like the Roddy counterexample, the knowledge-undermining 
luck is very direct in that the luck concerns the relation between the belief and the 
fact. One’s belief is erroneously formed but there is a lucky fact that renders it true. 
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Luck intervenes between the belief and the fact. On the contrary, in cases like the one 
Barney is in, the knowledge-undermining luck is quite indirect; indeed, it is 
specifically environmental. Barney does look at a real barn and believes that there is a 
real barn in front of him. At a first glance, there is nothing wrong with the way he 
forms his belief. Given, however, the particular environmental conditions, he cannot 
acquire knowledge in this way. Luck interferes with the environment in such a way 
that even a normally well-formed belief will be a lucky one, if true.  So, it seems that 
while robust virtue epistemology can deal with the normal (i.e., non-environmental) 
knowledge-undermining epistemic luck involved in Gettier cases, it may not be able 
to deal specifically with environmental knowledge-undermining luck, involved in 
Gettier-style cases such as the one Barney finds himself in.    
 And neither, it seems, can it deal with ‘epistemic twin earth’ counterexamples.  
Drawing on Putnam’s (1975) famous thought experiment, which (supposedly) shows 
that the contents of our beliefs cannot be narrowly defined, Kallestrup & Pritchard 
(forthcoming) have put forward an epistemic analogue to the effect that knowledge 
ascriptions cannot solely depend on psychological factors—i.e., whether an agent 
possesses a cognitive ability—because they also heavily rely on the safety of the 
environment the epistemic agent is situated in. In other words, robust virtue 
epistemology cannot fully account for knowledge because an adequate account 
requires the explicit endorsement of a condition that will ensure one’s beliefs are 
safely formed.          
 Before turning to the actual example, however, we should first go through 
some of the technical terms that Kallestrup & Pritchard use in their exposition of the 
thought experiment (forthcoming: 6): 
• Call the place where the subject is currently situated in the local environment: 
It contains the objects and properties that are the proximate causes of her current 
perceptual experiences. Take facts to be objects instantiating a property at a time. If 
the subject now perceives that p, then the fact that p (the ‘p-fact’) is one that concerns 
her local environment—i.e., it is a local fact. 
• The regional environment is not the place where the subject is currently in, 
nor the place she is typically located: 
Still, it contains the objects and properties with which she might easily have been 
causally connected. If the q-fact is such that if the subject had not now perceived that 
p then she would have perceived that q, then the q-fact is one that pertains to her 
regional environment—i.e., it is a regional fact. 
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Regional facts, therefore, are close nearby perceptual possibilities, even 
though, as a matter of fact, they play no causal role in producing the subject’s 
current perceptual experience on which she bases her belief that p. 
• Finally, the place where the subject is typically, though not at present, located 
is called the global environment: 
It contains the objects and properties with which she ordinarily causally interacts. The 
global facts thus comprise all the facts that extend in space-time beyond the regional 
facts. Assuming the subject now perceives the local fact that p, the fact that r is a 
global fact only if she would not have perceived that r had she not perceived that p. 
Thus understood, one’s local environment is the part of one’s regional environment 
that one is currently attending to. One’s regional environment (including one’s local 
environment), however, might or might not be part of one’s global environment.  
 We can now proceed with the actual thought experiment. S is on earth where 
all watery stuff is H2O. Moreover, S’s perceptual ability is highly reliable in that a 
high frequency of her perceptual beliefs are actually true; based on a perceptual 
experience as of water, S forms the demonstrative belief that that’s water and intuition 
dictates that she also knows this.        
 Now, on twin earth, there is an intrinsic physical duplicate of S, twin-S. On 
twin-S’s global environment, all watery stuff is again H2O. Accordingly, twin-S can 
reliably form true beliefs about water while situated in her global environment. 
Moreover, in her local environment, twin-S’s belief about water is true as she is 
currently interacting with H2O. However, unbeknownst to twin-S, her present regional 
environment is full of twin-water, which is perceptually indistinguishable from water, 
but with chemical structure XYZ. Therefore, her current water-belief is only luckily 
true given that she could have so very easily interacted with twin-water, and her belief 
would have thereby been false: ‘that is to say, very easily could twin-S have believed 
that that’s water on the same basis—a perceptual experience as of water—without 
that being so’ (Kallestrup &Pritchard forthcoming: 7). Given that knowledge excludes 
luck, it follows that twin-S lacks knowledge.      
 Remember that S and twin-S are physical intrinsic duplicates embedded in 
identical global environments, and therefore, on Kallestrup & Pritchard’s account, 
both have the ability to detect water.  Accordingly, the upshot of the thought 
experiment is that their epistemic difference cannot be explained away in terms of the 
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possession or absence of the relevant cognitive ability. There must be another 
condition on knowledge that accounts for the fact that S knows that p, whereas twin-S 
does not.    
  Accordingly, on the basis of the Barney and ‘epistemic twin earth’ thought 
experiments, the authors conclude that robust virtue epistemology cannot ultimately 
do all the work that is expected to do. Despite initial expectations, the ability intuition 
on knowledge seems unable to fully accommodate the equally important intuition that 
knowledge must not be due to luck, viz. the anti-luck intuition on knowledge. The 
moral appears to be that these two intuitions about knowledge ‘impose independent 
epistemic demands on our theory of knowledge’ (Pritchard forthcoming: 2). 
 Consequently, friends of anti-luck epistemology claim that any adequate 
theory of knowledge must explicitly have as a central component an anti-luck 
epistemic condition such as the safety or the sensitivity principle.v These modal 
conditions on knowledge—in contrast to the ability condition on knowledge, which 
addresses the problem posed by knowledge-undermining luck only indirectly—are 
primarily targeted to capture the anti-luck requirement, as they are explicitly 
concerned with the responsiveness of one’s belief to relevant counterfactual 
circumstances (such as the scenario in which Barney looks at a barn-façade instead of 
a real barn). So the upshot is that for virtue reliabilism to be a fully adequate account 
of knowledge, it may well have to be supplemented by a specific anti-luck condition 
on knowledge such as safety or sensitivity.vi  
 
A Response 
 
The problem robust virtue epistemology faces has now been sufficiently described. It 
is time, then, to explore in what ways virtue epistemologists might respond. To start 
with, we must first provide an account of abilities we can work on.   
 In general, ability can be thought of as a (cognitive) process, which is reliable. 
In some more detail, the ability to R can be thought of as reliable dispositional, or 
habitual (cognitive) process with outcome R, possessed by an agent. Reliability is 
here understood as a successful track record to R.  Naturally, the success of a process 
depends on the ‘background conditions’ against which the process is exercised. 
 Notice that ‘background conditions’ might refer both to a broad environment, 
E—a set of relatively stable circumstances—and more particular conditions, C—a 
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range of shifting circumstances within E. Even though, as Greco (2010: 77) notes, the 
two terms might overlap this should not create any problems for the account. To 
provide a few examples, the environment might refer to the presence of gravity, air, or 
good lighting, whereas conditions might refer to the absence of oil or ice on the 
tarmac, or to the requirement that the piano is well tuned. Moreover, conditions might 
refer to the quality of the potential input (i.e., stimuli) that might be fed in the target 
process, or even to internal aspects of the subject such as sobriety or tiredness.  
 Having the above considerations in mind, it can now be claimed that a 
(cognitive) process P will signify ability to R if and only if its success rate within E, C 
to R is such that the process counts as reliable. Schematically:  
A (cognitive) process P signifies ability to R in E, C if and only if Sp (E, C) to 
R > threshold of success rate for reliability.  
 
 Notice, further, that abilities, seen as reliable (cognitive) processes, are 
acquired over a long period of time through constant interaction of the agent with the 
environment wherein he is typically situated.vii In Kallestrup and Pritchard’s terms, 
abilities are tied to the global environment in which they are acquired and possessed: 
‘Abilities are relative only to the stable environment in which whoever has them is 
typically located […] These are the normal circumstances in which abilities are 
acquired through learning and sustained through practice’ (forthcoming: 10). In 
particular, it could be claimed that cognitive processes are developed both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically within a given environment. This is the 
environment, which the relevant processes evolved/were designed to reliably operate 
in. In addition, it should be uncontroversial to claim that when some ability is 
acquired, a physical substrate that supports the relevant process is also developed. 
This physical substrate will usually be found within the neural architecture of the 
agent’s brain, and possibly her bodily structure as well (I will return to these claims in 
the last section).viii Overall, then, we might say that when in her normal environment a 
subject exhibits a high success rate to R on the basis of a (cognitive) process, the 
subject possesses the ability to R (relative to her normal environment).  
 Given changes in E, C, however, what the above formulation also 
demonstrates is that the success rate of an otherwise reliable process might 
significantly fall. Accordingly, given defective E’, C’ one of the following might be 
claimed:  
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1) The subject does not posses the ability in question any more. 
                                                Or, 
2) The subject cannot manifest the ability in question any more.  
 
Notice this is exactly the situation Barney is in; he is in an abnormal environment—
full of barn-facades—wherein his otherwise reliable process of detecting real barns 
through vision could have so very easily outputted a false belief.  Since virtue 
epistemologists want to avoid using the safety principle—which would obviously 
offer the desired result—the only way to deny knowledge to Barney, as intuition 
dictates, is by taking up either option 1) or 2).     
 Let us explore the first avenue first. This is actually the tactics Allan Millar 
(2010) employs. Millar first distinguishes between a narrow and a broad construal of 
abilities. Briefly, to say that abilities are narrowly construed is to follow the typical 
way of thinking about abilities as having their bases mostly within the organismic 
boundaries of the individuals, and letting ‘environment’ and ‘conditions’ only 
determine whether they can be appropriately employed. On the contrary, to say that 
abilities are broad is to support the radical claim that the bases of abilities also include 
aspects of the ‘environment’ and/or the ‘conditions’. In effect, under the broad 
construal, abilities are only possessed in environments wherein they can be 
successfully exercised.ix  
 For instance, Millar—embracing the broad conception—holds that perception 
does not merely supervene on one’s psychology but also on physical features of 
things in the world. Whether a subject possesses the ability to detect an object heavily 
depends on the correlation between the object having the relevant appearance and the 
object actually being the thing it appears to be. Since this is not the case in the fake 
barn territory, Millar deals with Barney in the following way: 
 
When Barney judges falsely in fake-barn territory he fails to exercise an ability to tell 
of certain structures that they are barns from the way they look. Indeed, he does not 
have the ability to tell structures around there that they are barns from the way they 
look. Of course, when he is there he does something like that he also does back home 
—judge of some structures that look like barns that they are barns—and in doing so 
he will sometimes judge correctly. But that does not amount to his being able to tell 
of the structures that they are barns from the way they look (op. cit: 126-27). 
 
According to Millar, then, Barney does not have the ability in question and 
this allows robust virtue epistemologists to do away with the Barney case: just as 
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intuition dictates, Barney lacks knowledge simply because, given Barney’s abnormal 
environment, he does not possess the ability to detect real barns.   
 The ‘epistemic twin earth’ thought experiment, however, comes to the rescue 
for opponents of robust virtue epistemology. For since S and twin-S share identical 
global environments, it is not open for Millar to claim that the ability to detect water 
is possessed by S but not twin-S; in both S and twin-S’s global environments the 
circumstances are conducive to the development and appropriate employment of the 
relevant ability and, thereby, they are both capable of detecting water. Therefore, it 
appears that Millar cannot account for twin-S’s epistemic difference in the same way 
he does for Barney.         
 At his point, however, Millar could apparently object that Kallestrup & 
Pritchard beg the question against his view. Why should it be the case that global, 
instead of regional environments—as in effect Millar argues—bear on considerations 
regarding the possession of ability?  On a first view, the reason why Kallestrup & 
Pritchard’s account appears to be more appealing is that Millar’s account leads to the 
counterintuitive result that the possession of abilities comes and goes with changes in 
the epistemic agent’s environment; even if I cannot ride my motorbike on sand, I do 
not thereby need to re-acquire my driving ability when I get back on the street. This 
would be a rather awkward conclusion to draw. Accordingly, I want to suggest that 
the reason why Millar’s view appears to be counterintuitive has to do with an 
observation we made earlier. When one acquires some ability on the basis of one’s 
interaction with one’s normal (i.e., global) environment, this is mirrored in one’s 
neural and bodily architecture. That is, through training within one’s normal 
environment, one acquires a bodily process, which is successful within that particular 
environment. When one, however, finds oneself in defective circumstances one does 
not lose the relevant process that the corresponding ability is identified with; the 
neural and bodily structure cannot—at least not out of a sudden—disappear. What 
happens, instead, is that the relevant process cannot manifest the reliability it usually 
does relative to the environment it was acquired for. In other words, given that the 
physical processes supporting the relevant ability—i.e., the realization basis of the 
ability—cannot suddenly vanish, what we should claim is that, in inappropriate 
environments, the relevant cognitive processes simply cannot manifest their 
reliability; therefore, ability cannot be manifested.x This should also explain why 
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provided that one moves back to one’s normal environment soon enough, one does 
not need to re-acquire the ability in question.       
Accordingly, it appears more appropriate to say that once one has acquired 
some ability (i.e., has developed the relevant reliable cognitive process) within and 
relative to one’s (global) environment, one possesses the target ability wherever one 
might be situated in, but can only manifest it when the appropriate circumstances 
obtain. Kallestrup & Pritchard concede this point when they write: ‘Temporary 
abnormal environments cannot rob a subject of an ability that she otherwise reliably 
manifests in the normal run of things’ (forthcoming: 11).    
 Notice that this is actually the second option left open for robust virtue 
epistemologists in order to account for both the Barney and the ‘epistemic twin earth’ 
case. Instead of claiming that the agents do not possess the relevant abilities, one 
should claim that they do possess the relevant abilities when considered in relation to 
their global environments wherein they acquired them and typically employ them, but 
the special circumstances obtaining in their regional environments disallow both 
Barney and twin-S’s abilities to be appropriately manifested. In other words, the fact 
that barn- and water-appearances are not distinctive of real barns and water 
respectively, is one of the background conditions that need to, but do not obtain for 
their abilities to be appropriately employed (i.e., manifested).xi Accordingly, since no 
abilities are manifested in those cases, what explains the two agents’ true beliefs is the 
good luck that they happened to interact with the only real things they were looking 
for.             
 As a matter of fact, Kallestrup and Pritchard anticipate this kind of response 
when they write the following:  
The causal explanatory reading [of robust virtue epistemology] doesn’t fare any 
better on this score. For given that the local environments that S and twin-S inhabit 
are completely identical, it is hard to see how there should be a different causal 
explanation offered of their respective cognitive successes. Since the explanandum 
(i.e., true belief) is identical in the two cases, the explanations would differ only if a 
difference in explanans could be established. But what could that possibly be? 
Remember that, at this juncture, we take S and twin-S to be sharing all pertinent 
cognitive abilities. For while Greco [2009, 21-22] is surely right that abilities are tied 
to conditions understood as local environments, it remains that only the outcomes of 
exercising abilities can shift with variations in local facts, and not whether abilities 
are possessed at all. […] So, if one such ability features in the causal explanation of 
S’s true belief, it would also do so in the case of twin-S’s true belief. Likewise, no 
local physical facts could be cited in one causal explanation but not the other. True, 
causal explanations frequently involve extrinsic properties, but as S and twin-S also 
share global physical environments, Greco needs to show that the differences in their 
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regional environments somehow is bound to bear on the causal explanations in 
question. 
 
Kallestrup and Pritchard are surely correct when they write that twin-S’s global 
environment explains why twin-S possesses the relevant ability and that his local 
environment explains why his belief is actually true. Having conceded this, however, 
let me also note that the rest of their assessment is not entirely correct. For while the 
fact that S and twin-S share identical global and local environments explains why they 
both believe from ability and that their beliefs are also true respectively, it is only in 
S’s case that robust virtue epistemologists’ crucially stronger requirement that ‘belief 
be true in virtue of resulting from the exercise of ability’ is satisfied. On the contrary, 
both in the Barney and the twin-S case, the overarching factor in the causal 
explanation of how they believe the truth of the matter is luck, because, given their 
regional environments, their abilities cannot be appropriately manifested. Of course, 
this is not to say that their abilities played no role in forming their beliefs, since it is 
those very abilities that provided them with the content of their beliefs. Crucially, 
however, given the regional circumstances, their abilities are not the reason why they 
got to the truth of the matter.        
 So, what in effect I am arguing for is that the manifestation of abilities 
depends on one’s regional environment. Accordingly, the differences between 
Barney’s and twin-S’s regional environments and the regional environments of their 
counterparts should adequately explain their epistemic differences. That is, as 
Kallestrup & Pritchard request at the end of the above quote, we now have a reason to 
think why the differences in the epistemic agents’ regional environments are bound to 
bear on the causal explanations regarding their epistemic differences. One’s global 
environment explains whether one possesses some ability and one’s local 
environment explains whether one’s ability is actually accurate. However, one’s 
believing the truth should be because of the manifestation of the relevant ability, 
which, in turn, depends on one’s regional environment.     
 Before concluding, however, here are two possible ways in which Kallestrup 
& Pritchard could possibly rejoin the discussion. First, they could claim that it is facts 
about one’s local environment that should bear on considerations regarding the 
manifestation of some ability. To see, however, why this is a non-starter first recall 
that whether an already possessed ability is manifested within a specific environment 
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depends on the (actual or theoretical) success rate of the corresponding cognitive 
process within that environment. Notice, however, that one’s local environment, as 
defined by Kallestrup & Pritchard, picks out only a particular, well-defined and non-
changing aspect of the world against which no success rate can be calculated simply 
because there is only one possibility available. On the contrary, one’s regional 
environment offers the set of relevantly close possibilities for interaction, on the basis 
of which success rates can be appropriately estimated, thereby allowing the success 
rate of an otherwise reliable process to be assessed.xii    
 Second, another possible objection could be to claim that abilities are 
dispositions. Regional facts, however, do not disallow dispositions from being 
manifested. For example, salt is soluble in water, but not XYZ. Accordingly, if we 
drop crystals of salt in a glass of water, it will dissolve even if many other glasses, 
which are full of XYZ, surround that particular glass. Given this discrepancy, 
therefore, there must be a problem with the offered account of abilities. In response, 
notice the equivocality involved in the meaning of the word ‘disposition’. On one 
hand, to claim that cognitive abilities are dispositions means that abilities are 
character traits, or habitual behaviors that the agent tends to exhibit.  On the other 
hand, to claim that an object, or an entity has a certain disposition to behave in a 
certain way, such as that the vase is fragile or that salt is soluble in water is quite a 
different claim, whose meaning is also the topic of a very thorough and presently 
unsettled debate.xiii An indication—not irrelevant to the present discussion—that the 
two uses of the word are not the same is the fact that dispositions, in the first sense of 
the term, can only be acquired and sustained through practice, whereas dispositions, 
in the second meaning of the term, can be possessed by an entity even if they are 
never actually manifested (e.g., a vase may be fragile even if it has never been 
broken). Accordingly, given both that there is an ambiguity in the term, and that the 
second sense of the term is far from well-understood, the fact that cognitive abilities 
are dispositions that seem to behave differently from the dispositions possessed by 
objects is not compelling grounds for rejecting the offered account of abilities.  
 To conclude, then, we now have a principled way to account for the epistemic 
difference between S and twin-S, and why Barney lacks knowledge without appealing 
to an anti-luck condition on knowledge. That is, abilities understood as reliable 
cognitive processes whose manifestation depends on one’s regional environment 
provide robust virtue epistemology with a principled way to account not just for 
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epistemic, but environmental knowledge-undermining luck as well. Should this, 
however, come as a surprise, or is there a natural explanation for the fact that abilities 
appear to be safe? 
 
Reliability and Safety, Naturalized 
 
It is not long ago that, in a visiting lecture, Dan Dennett mentioned ‘Darwin’s strange 
inversion of reasoning’ (Dennett 2009): the idea that we can have competence without 
comprehension, or, in other words, that it is not necessary to think that every 
purposeful object must have a designer. Evolutionary biology demonstrates that all 
living species exhibit traits and/or abilities that help them deal with the natural 
environments they inhabit. Crucially, however, far from being the products of a 
meaningful design, the evolution of the relevant traits is the product of a meaningless 
process of trial-and-error that extends thousands of years in the past of each species’ 
lineage.          
 There is no doubt that human beings too, as natural beings, are the products of 
evolutionary development. Accordingly, their capacities for knowledge and belief are 
also the products of a natural evolutionary development. This, in turn, provides a 
basis for thinking that knowing, as a natural activity, could appropriately be analyzed 
along the lines compatible with its status, i.e., by the methods of natural science, and 
specifically evolutionary biology.       
 This is the project of evolutionary epistemology, which properly falls under 
the trend of naturalized epistemology. Interestingly, virtue epistemology with its 
appeal to cognitive abilities is well suited for a naturalized analysis of knowledge; as 
noted in the previous section, abilities have their realization bases on processes 
mirrored by the neural and bodily architecture of the organisms that exhibit them. 
And as Patricia Churchland (1987: 548-49) notes, ‘the principal chore of nervous 
system is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may 
survive’. 
 Since it is well beyond the scope of the present paper to offer a detailed 
account of the evolution of epistemological mechanisms, I will only provide a 
description in broad strokes. Still, this should hopefully be sufficient to hint at the 
claim that reliable cognitive processes are also safe in the epistemologically relevant 
sense.           
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 The central point we can start with is an observation made in the previous 
section, namely that biological development involves both ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic considerations. That is, the possession of specific traits can be viewed 
both from the point of view of the development of that trait in individual organisms 
(ontogeny) and the evolution of that trait in the species’ lineage (phylogeny). 
Although the two levels of adaptation cannot be properly disentangled—since there is 
a constant mutual interaction between them—it could be claimed that phylogeny is 
responsible for the carving of the organisms’ bodily characteristics that can support a 
range of abilities, whereas ontogeny is responsible for the more fine grained 
articulation of the bodies that organisms are born with, throughout the individuals’ 
lifetime.           
 Crucially, what both levels of adaptation have in common is that they operate 
on the basis of some kind of trial-and-error procedure of fine-tuning. 
Phylogenetically, only the organisms gifted with the DNA sequences that will 
produce the corresponding fittest phenotypes (always relative to a particular 
environment) will survive to the age of reproduction, and so only the fittest DNA 
sequences will be passed on to the next generations. This is, however, not an act of 
meaningful design. Far from it, it is an iterated process of trial-and-error whereby 
random mutations are selected by the forces of nature.xiv  
Similarly, most connectionist models of the ontogenetic shaping of neural 
systems—largely thought to be the most biologically realistic ones—employ learning 
algorithms, with ‘backward propagation of errors’ being the most typical one: 
  
 ‘A connectionist model is characterized by three architectural elements: (1) 
processing units, (2) connections between processing units, and (3) weights, which 
are differential strengths of connections between processing units […] The network 
does not have any initial or built-in organization for processing the input […] All 
such organization emerges during the training period. The values of the weights are 
determined by using the learning algorithm called “back-propagation of error.” The 
strategy exploits the calculated error between the actual values of the processing units 
in the output layer and desired values, which are provided by a training signal. The 
error signal is propagated from the layer backward to the input layer and is used to 
adjust each weight in the network. The network learns as the weights are changed to 
minimize the mean squared error […] Thus, the system can be characterized as 
following a path in weight space until it finds an error minimum’ (Churchland 1987: 
550).xv  
  
So, we see that the strategy for shaping connectionist networks on the basis of ‘back-
propagation of error’ is, again, an iterated process of trial-and-error fine-tuning, 
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whereby the network tries out several connections for processing the input, so as to 
eventually minimize error.  
This iterated process of fine-tuning by trial-and-error, present in both levels of 
adaptation, is crucial to see why the reliability of evolutionary epistemic mechanisms 
might imply safety. Trial-and-error fine-tuning requires a vast number of natural 
forces (in the case of natural selection) and inputs (in the case of ontogenetic 
development) in order to bring about the desired results. In nature, these natural forces 
and inputs originate from one’s global environment and, crucially, it is the sum of 
these inputs that determine the sort of epistemic mechanisms that will eventually 
evolve and develop. What this means, then, is that evolutionary mechanisms are 
highly calibrated to operate in these environments such that they can accommodate 
and overcome any physical discrepancies that might occur. As a result, given that they 
are employed within the environments they were selected and developed for, there 
should be no defective conditions these epistemic mechanisms will not have been 
calibrated to compensate for. Consequently, if they operate within their normal 
environment, evolutionary mechanisms cannot easily produce false outputs. 
Conversely, if a species’ global environment suddenly contained such discrepancies 
as in Barney or Twin-S’s regional environments, then either the individuals bearing 
the defective traits (relative to their new environments) would disappear, taking with 
them the relevant traits, or, if biologically possible, mechanisms that could 
accommodate the relevant discrepancies would evolve and/or develop.   
 It follows, then, that so long as a subject employs her abilities in her global 
environment, there are no close possibilities of error; it is not the case that her abilities 
could have easily been wrong. That is, the products of abilities—defined as reliable 
cognitive processes—are safe, provided that the relevant abilities are employed within 
one’s global environment.             
 It, therefore, appears that we now have a natural explanation in support of the 
claim that reliability implies safety. Before closing, however, a few methodological 
remarks are in order. Obviously, the ‘competence without comprehension’ idea 
regarding the evolution and development of cognitive abilities is a strong indication 
towards the validity of externalist theories of knowledge; one can be competent in 
performing R without having access to (i.e., comprehending) the reasons on the basis 
of which one can perform R.         
 While this aspect of the analysis might be considered as a welcome outcome 
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by many contemporary epistemologists, a common objection is that naturalized 
epistemology cannot account for the normative aspect of epistemology. As Patricia 
Churchland (1987: 546) comments, however, ‘once we understand what reasoning is, 
we can begin to figure out what reasoning well is’. So, do the above considerations 
point to what reasoning well is?       
 It appears they do. Robust virtue epistemologists’ claim is that knowledge is 
belief, which is true in virtue of cognitive ability (i.e., a reliable cognitive belief-
forming process). In addition, the above analysis demonstrates that already possessed 
abilities can be manifested (i.e., appropriately employed) only when they operate 
within the environments they were developed and selected for, or relevantly similar 
ones. Accordingly, robust virtue epistemologists could claim that S knows that p if 
and only if S believes the truth regarding p because of cognitive ability and S is 
situated within her global environment.xvi In other words, a good epistemic agent 
ought to employ her cognitive abilities and accept the corresponding beliefs only 
when situated within her global environment. Notice, moreover, that one can be very 
easily aware whether one is situated within one’s normal environment. So, for 
instance, if I were the first to land on Pandora and wanted to believe what is true—
which I probably would for reasons of survival—I would be a very bad epistemic 
agent were I to trust my otherwise reliable senses. In that planet, what looks and feels 
like water might not be water and plants, for all I know, might have feet and teeth. 
This is not my normal environment. 
Now, the above considerations bring to mind Greco’s subjective justification 
requirement for knowledge. To see why, let us follow Greco who notes (1999: 285) 
that ‘it is not enough that one’s belief is formed in a way that is objectively reliable; 
one’s belief must be formed in a way that is subjectively appropriate as well’. 
Nevertheless, in order to remain fast to externalism Greco warns that subjective 
justification must be accommodated in a way that does not involve knowledge of, or 
even beliefs about reliability. Accordingly, he proposes (1999: 289) that ‘a belief p is 
subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having knowledge) if 
and only if S’s believing p is grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S manifests 
when S is thinking conscientiously’ (i.e., when S is motivated to believe what is true). 
Now, according to the normative claim offered in the previous paragraph, a 
conscientious thinker, i.e., one who wants to believe what is true, is one who is 
sensitive to the aptness of one’s environment. Crucially to the point, however, notice 
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that epistemic agents do not need to have any positive beliefs that their belief-forming 
processes are appropriate relative to the environment they employ them. It just 
happens, as in the case of landing on Pandora, that if the environment appears to be 
hostile or, at least, a new one, then (and only then) conscientious thinkers will just 
proceed with caution, being suspicious of the deliverances of their cognitive 
abilities.xvii 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, we have seen a way in which robust virtue epistemology might explain 
away troubling counterexamples such as the Barney and the ‘twin epistemic earth’ 
cases. In such cases, while the normality of the agents’ global and local environments 
explains why they believe from ability and why their beliefs turn out to be actually 
true respectively, the abnormality of their regional environments disallows them to 
manifest their cognitive abilities. Accordingly, their beliefs are true not because of 
their cognitive abilities but in virtue of luck. As far as those two counterexamples are 
concerned then, virtue epistemology does not appear to be in need of being 
supplemented by a distinct anti-luck condition on knowledge. Evolutionary and 
developmental considerations, moreover, appear to suggest that reliable belief-
forming processes are also safe in the epistemologically relevant sense. The reason is 
that cognitive abilities, being the products of natural selection and ontogenetic 
development, are calibrated to accommodate possible discrepancies within the 
environment that shaped them. Accordingly, given they are exercised within one’s 
global environment, cognitive abilities cannot easily be wrong. That is, there are no 
close nearby possibilities in which they could produce false outputs; they are safe. 
Interestingly, these considerations do not just offer a descriptive analysis of 
knowledge but they also provide an instructive epistemic norm. That is, epistemic 
agents are objectively justified when their beliefs are indeed the products of reliable 
belief-forming processes; epistemic agents, however, in order to be also subjectively 
justified, ought to accept the deliverances of their cognitive abilities only when they 
don’t have any doubts that they operate within their normal environments and under 
the appropriate conditions (or relevantly similar ones).xviiixix  
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Notes 
                                                
i See (Greco 2010) and (Sosa 2007). Note, however, that both of these authors add a 
subjective condition on knowledge, as well. Sosa holds that reflective knowledge is 
apt belief, aptly formed. Greco, in turn, holds that whereas a belief is objectively 
justified for S if it is the product of a reliable belief-forming process, S won’t have 
acquired knowledge unless he is also subjectively justified by being conscientious, 
i.e., by accepting the beliefs, which are the product of the belief-forming processes 
that he manifests when he is motivated to believe what is true. I will return to Greco’s 
subjective justification criterion at the end of the last section.  
ii See ft. 5 for a formulation of the safety principle. 
iii The Roddy case is described in Chisholm (1977: 105). 
iv The Barney case is described in Goldman (1976) and credited to Carl Ginet. 
v The sensitivity principle is usually formulated as follows: If S knows that p, then S’s 
true belief that p, is such that, had p been false, S would not have believed p. The 
classic defenses of the sensitivity principle can be found in Dretske (1970) and 
Nozick (1981). The safety principle is usually understood thusly: if S knows that p, 
then S’s true belief that p, is such that S’s belief that p could not have easily been 
false. For recent defenses of the safety principle see Sosa (1999, 2000) and Pritchard 
(2002, 2008). For a very good discussion concerning the relation between the ability 
and the anti-luck intuition on knowledge see Pritchard (forthcoming).  
vi Consider for example Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if 
S’s safe belief that p is the product of her relevant cognitive abilities (such that her 
safe cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency) 
(Pritchard forthcoming: 20). Again, in (Pritchard 2010b: 76) we can read: ‘knowledge 
is safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that make up one’s 
cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree 
creditable to one’s cognitive character’. 
vii Accordingly, notice that E, C, in the above formulation, refer to one’s normal 
environment. To avoid confusion, if I want to indicate that a subject is situated in an 
environment other than her normal one, I will write ‘E’, C’’. 
viii I here say ‘usually’ because I do not want to exclude in advance active externalism 
as proposed in contemporary philosophy of mind. Notice, however, that active 
externalism should be contrasted with Putnam’s (1975) and Burge’s (1986) passive 
externalism. For more details and a thoroughgoing exposition and defense of active 
externalism, see (Clark 2008). Moreover, Pritchard (2010a) and (Palermos 2011) have 
argued for the introduction of active externalism into contemporary epistemology. 
ix Thanks to Evan Butts (forthcoming) for bringing to my attention Millar’s 
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distinction. 
x Recall that ability has been defined as a reliable cognitive process. The gist of the 
above considerations is that whereas the possession of ability depends both on the 
existence and the reliability of the underlying cognitive process relative to the 
environment it was acquired for, its manifestation depends solely on the (actual or 
theoretical) reliability of the cognitive process within the environment it is being 
currently employed (i.e., one’s regional environment).  
xi In contrast, Millar would claim that because of the defective background conditions, 
the relevant abilities are not possessed.   
xiiAnother way to put the above point could be to consider, as defined in the beginning 
of the section, that success rates depend on conditions. Remember, however, that 
local facts are such that if S now perceives that p then p is a local fact. What this 
means is that local environments are very narrow aspects of the world that cannot 
plausibly pick out any conditions of one’s surroundings but only particular details of 
it. That is to say, conditions, properly understood, do not refer to specificities but 
rather to ambient features or situations in the world one is embedded in. Put another 
way, conditions do not usually concern second by second interactions of a subject 
with minute details of her surroundings. Instead, it would be more plausible to claim 
that conditions, when they refer to external facts of the world, should rather be 
identified with the regional facts: the rest of the facts which the subject could have 
interacted with had she attended something different from what she actually does. 
xiii Indicatively, see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘Dispositions’ 
by Micahel Fara. 
xiv Notice that even though mutations do have causes, their appearance and which 
kind of phenotypes they will give rise to is supposed to be a matter of luck in the 
sense that they are not induced for a particular purpose. 
xvSee also (D.E Rumelhart, G.E Hinton, and R.J. Williams 1986).  
xvi Or a relevantly similar one.  
xvii Consider also Greco’s (1999: 23) very instructive example: ‘For example suppose 
that it seems visually to a person that a cat is sleeping on the couch, and on this basis 
she believes that there is a sleeping cat on the couch. Suppose also that this belief 
manifests a disposition that the person has, to trust this sort of experience under these 
sorts of conditions, when motivated to believe the truth. Now, suppose that much less 
clearly, it seems visually to the person that a mouse has run across the floor. Not 
being disposed to trust this kind of fleeting experience, the person refrains from 
believing until further evidence comes in. The fact that the person, properly 
motivated, is disposed to trust one kind of experience but not the other, constitutes 
sensitivity on her part that the former is reliable. There is a clear sense in which she 
takes the former experience to be adequate to her goal of believing the truth, and takes 
the latter experience not to be. And this is so even if she has no beliefs about her 
goals, her reliability, or her experience’.  
xviii Finally what about skepticism? Do the previous considerations offer a way out of 
the problem of radical skepticism? Unfortunately, they do not. Skepticism is as alive 
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and kicking as ever. What the above considerations demonstrate, however, is how bad 
a joke it would be, were we to be the victims of a skeptical scenario. It is not only the 
case that all of our beliefs could be an illusion produced by an evil demon, or a 
supercomputer in the service of a crazy scientist, but our potential jokesters must have 
also produced such a consistently rich environment that contains evidence in support 
of the idea that we do not need a loving creator (or luck) being responsible for the 
veridicality of our abilities, because there are evolutionary and developmental natural 
processes that could plausibly bring about the very same result. Going to such an 
extent so as to deceive us about the nature of our beliefs, would be a very mean joke 
indeed.  
xviiiResearch into the area of this paper was partly supported by the AHRC-funded 
‘Extended Knowledge’ Project, based at the Eidyn research centre, University of 
Edinburgh. 
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